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ABSTRACT
This article examines the decision–making processes within political parties in Latvia. Two important 
variables have been chosen for analysis: 1) policy formulation (which actors are involved in the 
elaboration of election programs), and 2) candidate selection (how parties create their electoral lists). A 
survey of Saeima (Latvia’s parliamentary body) deputies indicates that party board members have the 
most say in deciding which individuals to include on electoral lists and which policies to pursue; financial 
supporters seem to have almost no impact on parties’ internal decision-making processes.
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INTRODUCTION 
Today, having a modern democracy without a competitive party system seems unthinkable. 
Political parties play the most important roles in state governance, policy formulation, interest 
representation, and elite recruitment and socialization. While the competitive aspect between 
parties is recognized as a necessary precondition for a stable and functioning democracy, the 
questions as to whether or not parties should also be internally democratic has been raised. The 
term intra-party democracy describes how and to what extent party members are involved in 
decision-making processes within their organization—including the recruiting party leadership, 
selecting candidates and formulating policies. Daunis Auers (2015, p.117) has indicated that 
“the least-researched dimension of Baltic political parties is the internal one: parties as 
organisations.” Auers has also pointed that parties in the region are “particularly opaque, having 
traditionally been seen as top-heavy and more reliant on centralized leadership than on the 
rank-and-file membership” (2015, p.117). Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina (2012) reach a 
similar conclusion on parties in central and Eastern Europe, that party organizations in the region 
are rather oligarchic. This article uses a survey of parliamentary deputies to determine which 
groups exercise the most impact over policy formulation and candidate selection processes 
that occur within Latvia’s political parties. In accordance with previous research, we expect that 
party boards (or party leadership) will have the most influence over policies and personalities 
within Latvia’s political parties.
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Interest in intra-party democracy has been emerging in academic debates for decades. 
Discussions of inter-party democracy tend to relate to two broad questions. The first of these 
two questions concerns the link between a democratic regime and the way its parties are 
governed internally. Can we have a viable democracy with political parties that are internally 
undemocratic? That is, should decision-making within parties reflect universal democratic 
norms? The second of the two primary questions related to inter-party democracy asks 
if parties with internal democratic decision-making practices can effectively fulfill their 
functions and compete with other parties. If democracy on a party level demands that a 
broad range of individuals have a say in party affairs, then some would also expect decision-
making processes to become more time consuming, less effective, and maybe even more 
bureaucratic. With this in mind, can internally democratic parties effectively react to urgent 
matters? Moreover, does internal democracy ensure the selection of the most suitable 
leadership for the political party or the formulation of the best-designed policies? Saglie 
and Heidar (2004, p. 365) have indicated that, “while inter-party competition is widely 
appreciated, intra-party democracy is questioned.” Thus, there is no concrete agreement 
as to whether parties with internally democratic decision-making structures are vital to 
democracy. And, if they are indeed vital, how exactly is universal democracy connected to 
or dependent on party democracy?
1. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
Intra-party democracy is often contrasted with party oligarchy. In an oligarchical party, members 
play a marginal role in policy formulation (Loxbo, 2011). Robert Michels (1915, 1962) has 
been skeptical about the prospects of a democracy that lacks internally democratic political 
parties. Yet, according to Michels, intra-party democracy was a mere utopia. Intra-party 
democracy is certainly desirable, but also unreachable in reality. Michel’s famous “iron law of 
oligarchy” implies that all organizational forms inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies within 
their structures. Another view is that in order to attain democracy, parties “must be ruled 
by oligarchic principles” (Teorell 1999, p. 364). In this view, what happens inside the parties 
is irrelevant as long as they secure democracy through free competition among different 
alternatives. According to Teorell and like-minded thinkers, what matters is competition 
amongst—not within—parties. Proponents against intra-party democracy often draw parallels 
with the competitive market, where parties compete for votes as enterprises compete for 
consumers, thus parties are accountable to their voters not to their members (Saglie and Heidar, 
2004). According to Duverger (1954), internal party democracy can cause serious problems 
for party competitiveness and hinder a party’s ability to compete with their opponents. “With 
decentralized authority structures and free discussion comes the risk of internal dissension” 
(Teorell, 1999, p. 364). Political parties comprise legislative bodies and form the government. 
The stability of these institutions depends on effective and cohesive parties. On the other 
hand, the gradual cartelization of parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) weakened the role of individual 
membership and strengthens the role of the state. Advocates of this view might argue that 
parties have evolved in such a manner as to offer a state-funded service to the voters. 
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In line with the party centralization thesis, questions about the role of intra-party democracy 
become less relevant and intra party democracy also appears less possible as elites establish 
control over party organizational structures. Loxbo observes that “mainstream party research 
tends to hypothesize, implicitly or explicitly, that intra-party democracy has declined, if not 
disappeared altogether” (2011, p. 538). Katz and Mair’s (1993) famous distinction implies three 
faces of party organization, those of: 1) the party in public office (parliament or government), 
2) the party on the ground (members, activists, and voters), and 3) the party central office 
(leadership of the party organization). In a later publication (Katz and Mair, 2002), they 
conclude that the party in public office dominates party organizational structure and has led 
to a weakening of the party on the ground. Essentially, leaders have melted with the party 
and vice versa. 
On the other hand, many scholars defend the premise of internally democratic parties. 
Democratic decision-making procedures may foster participation; as a result, “citizens can take 
an active part in decisions that affect their lives” (Saglie and Heidar, 2004, p. 386). Teorell (1995) 
defends the idea of deliberation by institutionalizing intra-party deliberative polls in manifesto 
elaboration and candidate selection procedures. It means that party members should not only be 
included in choosing among policy alternatives, they should also be involved in the formulation 
of these alternatives. Hence, they should evolve from passive actors to active decision-makers 
with the power to have a real influence over the content of policies. 
Ware (1979) has pointed out that internally democratic parties are less prone to oligopolistic 
conflicts between competing elite groups. Expanding the scope of those involved in decision-
making may also lead to the selection of the most capable leaders. Free competition can 
ensure that the most suitable party members are elected as party leaders. If the leadership or 
candidate selection is restricted to a limited number of people, backstage deals become more 
likely. Obviously, the presence of democratic mechanisms does not necessarily prevent secret 
deals or intrigues from occurring within a party, but they do afford party members the possibility 
to engage in the inner life of their organizations. Expanding the involvement of party members 
can prevent conflict and contain conflicts from the public eye, reducing the risks to a party’s 
image. On the contrary, if party elites constantly use their status to suppress others, internal 
imbalances can emerge and weaken the party’s organizational capacity. Parties suffering from 
internal struggles are unable to fruitfully perform their functions.
Since party leaders are crucial political figures, their selection is an important function for 
all political parties (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015). Party leadership “exercises major 
influence on the policy, (…) the party’s behavior vis-à-vis other parties, and typically the most 
important government position available to the party in office is reserved for the party leader” 
(Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015, p. 930). By changing their party’s leadership, party 
members can change party policy (Pettitt 2012).
In opposition to the cartel party thesis, which emphasizes the dominance of elites and their 
disregard for party members, Herbert Kitschelt (2000) argues that in times of weak party loyalty, 
party elites are actually more responsive to party members. Party members and loyal activists 
can be important agents for the party’s policies. They can promote the party to their particular 
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circles, thus enlarging their party’s electoral base. Even Katz and Mair (2002) have admitted 
that there is substantial evidence suggesting that parties have become more responsive to 
their ordinary members by involving members in important decision-making procedures. Party 
membership is still an asset to parties in many ways. Among a number of other advantages 
(Mair 1994), party members offer political parties: financial resources through the payment 
of membership fees; human resources as members can occupy positions inside or outside the 
party; and organizational and political resources as members not only attract new voters, but 
a large membership in itself legitimizes a party. 
As on the state level, on an organizational level, we cannot talk about absolute democracy. 
Every political party has its own degree of intra-party democracy. Robin T. Pettitt (2012, p. 630) 
observes that although “some parties are indeed more or less permanent oligarchies . . . others 
have seen an increase in membership influence.” Thus, democracy, on either the party level 
or the state level, cannot be absolute. “There are different democratic procedures as well as 
different degrees of internal democracy” (Saglie and Heidar, 2004, p. 388).
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
Peter Mair (1994, p. 372) has written that “there continue to be severe limits to the comparative 
understanding of precisely how party organizations work.” Similarly, Loxbo (2011, p. 540) 
argues that “the inner life of party organizations remains largely unexplored” in terms of 
decision-making practices. Research about intra-party affairs is empirically challenging because 
it demands access to information that can only be obtained through direct contact with party 
representatives. An analysis of party documents (such as statutes) is fruitful to the extent that 
it reveals the formal existence or absence of democratic mechanisms embodied in a party’s 
decision-making processes. Moreover, party leaders might publicly defend their organization as 
democratic, but in reality it might not function according to democratic principles. Also, mass 
media coverage cannot provide a reliable view of the inner life of parties. Hence, for the larger 
public, decision-making inside these political organizations remains a rather concealed process. 
In 2014 we conducted face-to-face interviews with Latvia’s Saeima (parliament) deputies. 
Altogether, eighty of one hundred parliamentary members agreed to participate and to answer 
survey questions. Our survey, consisting of forty-two questions, covered a broad variety of topics 
including: use of social media, social group representation, party ideological placement, and 
electoral campaign organization among other topics. The survey also included two questions 
about decision-making procedures within the respondent’s particular party, that which the 
respondents represent or from which they were elected. Our first question concerned policy 
formulation. We asked respondents to evaluate the degree to which various actors have been 
involved in the elaboration of their parties electoral program. (We asked deputies to refer to the 
situation before the 11th Saeima elections in 2011). We distinguished between seven possible 
actors: 1) board members (party leadership), 2) deputy candidates, 3) party members in general 
(rank-and-file members), 4) experts from different areas, 5) society at large, 6) primary donors, 
and 7) political consultants and public relations experts. Each respondent was asked to evaluate 
the involvement of each of these seven groups on a scale of one to five. 
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Our second survey topic queried participants about the creation of electoral lists. We 
formulated eight statements that could describe the candidate selection process within a 
party and asked the participating deputies to evaluate how strongly they agreed or disagreed 
with each statement. For example, we asked participants to evaluate the degree to which they 
believed financial supporters impact candidate selection process, or whether their party tries to 
achieve a gender balance when formulating their electoral lists. A full list of these statements 
will be provided in the next section.
This research inevitably has several weaknesses and restrictions. In the first question, we only 
asked participants to mark the involvement of various actors in manifesto elaboration, however, 
we did not ask them to evaluate how inclusive or exclusive the policy formulation process within 
their parties are. Thus, we cannot conclude that the survey measures respondents’ satisfaction 
with the policy formulation processes within their respective parties. Moreover, we did not 
ask participants which groups should be given more (or less) access to their party’s manifesto 
elaboration, or which groups have disproportionate influence over policy development. Thus, 
this question can only partly measure intra-party democracy in the area of policy elaboration. 
We also are aware that the statements in the second question are not exhaustive and could be 
supplemented with other statements. Moreover, our query related to candidate list formation 
includes a variety of statements that not only measure the involvement of various actors, but 
also explore the process of creating candidate lists within a party on a more general level. For 
example, participants were asked whether their parties consider gender balance or give priority 
to publicly recognizable members during this process. 
The target population in this survey was parliamentary deputies. Thus, our research only 
addresses one organizational level of political parties in Latvia, namely, the party in public office 
(Katz and Mair, 1993). We did not include other party members, party activists outside the 
parliament, or members at parties’ organizational levels. Thus, our obtained empirical results 
can be biased, because our survey respondents, to put it simply, are the 2011 election winners. 
Moreover, our respondents, parliamentary deputies, are the members of their respective parties 
who have successfully negotiated the internal candidate selection processes and obtained a seat 
in Latvia’s parliament. In other words, they may be less critical about internal decision making 
processes than other members of their respective parties who were not elected or not included 
on the candidate list. This aspect has to be taken into consideration while interpreting the data.
3. THE INNER LIVES OF LAT VIA’S POLITICAL PARTIES
Decision-making practices in Latvia’s political parties have not been systematically researched. In 
fact, there is practically no empirically valid and reliable data about decision-making processes 
in Latvia’s political parties1. This research contributes to the lack of practical knowledge about 
1  In 2009, the Latvian branch of Transparency International, Delna, conducted a study titled, How Democratic 
are Latvian Political Parties? Delna examined the candidate selection procedures for municipality elections in two 
cities, Riga and Jurmala. The researchers concluded that decision-making processes within the Latvian parties 
studied were closed and that the involvement of party members was minimal. More information about the project 
can be found at http://delna.lv/wpcontent/uploads/old_files/Zinojums_Partiju%20ieksheja%20demokratija.pdf
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the internal functioning of political parties in Latvia. It also gives a wider insight on how party 
members evaluate and think about the regulations that guide their respective party’s internal life.
Table 1 relates participants’ responses to various statements about how the respondent’s 
party creates candidate lists. In responding to each statement, we asked deputies to consider 
only the national elections.




2 3 4 5 (strongly agree)
Do not 
know / NA
In the candidate selection process, 
priority is given to the members 
who are most active internally.
1.3% 3.8% 24.1% 41.8% 26.6% 2.5%
In the candidate selection process, 
priority is given to the members 
most well known to the public. 
- 1.3% 11.4% 45.6% 39.2% 2.5%
In choosing candidates, my party 
tries to consider gender balance.
29.1% 22.8% 27.8% 13.9% 2.5% 3.8%
The criteria for candidate selection 
criteria is well known in my party.
6.3% 10.1% 26.6% 35.4% 17.7% 3.8%
My party’s candidate selection 
process is open and clear.
7.6% 11.4% 32.9% 31.6% 13.9% 2.5%
In the candidate selection process, 
my party tries to balance the inter-
ests of all members.
10.1% 19.0% 32.9% 26.6% 8.9% 2.5%
The final candidate selection deci-
sion is made by my party’s board.
1.3% 1.3% 10.1% 25.3% 59.5% 2.5%
Financial supporters have an 
impact on my party’s candidate 
selection process.
44.2% 26.0% 13.0% 7.8% 1.3% 7.8%
SOURCE: Survey of Saeima deputies, conducted in June and July 2014
In Table 1, the first two statements explore the degree to which the respondents’ parties 
give special priority to internally active members or those who are publicly recognizable. 
Offering a place in the electoral list to intra-party activists might be viewed as a reward for their 
commitment and contribution to party activities. The other statement might reveal a more 
tactical strategy, the inclusion of popular personalities, official party members or famous people 
outside the party, in electoral lists can attract both the voters and media coverage parties seek 
during electoral campaigns. Voter behavior in Latvia demonstrates that well-known personalities 
play an important role in determining electoral outcomes. Data show that most parliamentary 
members tend to agree with both statements. Namely, most respondents agree (almost 42 
per cent) or strongly agree (26 per cent) that in the formation of electoral lists, priority is given 
to those that have been active party members. Similarly, the majority of respondents agrees 
(45 per cent) or strongly agrees (39 per cent) that a candidate’s popularity can play a role in 
the candidate list formation. 
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Gender balance has become a particularly important issue. The under-representation of 
women in national and local politics (as well as in the higher ranks of the public sector) has 
stoked debates about formal mechanisms that could foster a more equal representation of 
women on parties’ electoral lists. In Latvia, party regulation does not impose any obligation for 
equal gender representation. Thus, parties are not forced to consider gender-related criteria 
while forming their candidate lists or electing party leadership. A willingness to achieve a more 
balanced candidate selection remains an internal issue for Latvia’s parties. As the data show, 
most parliament members reject that their parties would pay attention to the gender issue in 
candidate selection. Only about 16 per cent of the respondents expressed that achieving equal 
gender representation played a role in the candidate list formation process. Some deputies 
commented that the professionalism of the potential candidate should be given the highest 
priority, not gender.
The survey also included two statements that aimed to measure the existence or absence 
of candidate selection criteria and the overall openness of this process. Most respondents 
agreed (35 per cent) or strongly agreed (17 per cent) that the candidate selection criteria are 
well known to party members, while 16 per cent of surveyed parliament members disagreed. 
Again, these results may be biased and may not represent the overall opinion of party members 
as the respondents have been elected to the national parliament; thus they might be tempted 
to favor their party’s internal mechanisms for candidate selection. A similar distribution of 
answers is evident in responses to the statement concerning the openness of the candidate 
selection process. Forty-five per cent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the 
candidate selection procedure in their parties can be described as open and clear. 
Our questions about electoral list formation also included a statement related to a 
balance of interests within the party, namely, whether parties try to consider the interests of 
all members while designing their candidate lists for parliament elections. Almost one-fifth 
of the participating parliamentary deputies admitted that this is not practically possible, 
while more than 35 per cent of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their party’s 
candidate selection procedure is designed to the balance interests of all party members. 
The final two statements aimed to examine the impact of two important groups of actors 
on deputy candidate selection. One statement concerned whether the party board gave a 
final approval for candidate lists and another was related to the impact of a party’s financial 
supporters. Almost 85 per cent of respondents admitted that their party’s board grants 
the approval for or disapproval of their party’s candidate lists. This means that party board 
members can, if necessary, modify the order of candidates’ positions on a candidate list 
or withdraw candidates deemed unsuitable. As expected, party members are not keen to 
discuss the influence of party sponsors. Many of the respondents reacted to this question by 
commenting that they have no relationship with their party’s financial donors. Only nine per 
cent admitted that party donors have some say in the deputy candidate selection process. 
The majority of respondents either disagreed with the statement about donor influence or 
said that they do not have enough information to determine whether or not donors have an 
impact on their party’s internal affairs. 
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The second variable we wanted to examine was related to policy formulation within Latvia’s 
political parties. Survey respondents were asked to evaluate the involvement of different actors 
in the process of elaborating their party’s manifesto on a scale of one (not involved) to five 
(very involved). We specifically asked participants to respond based on their party’s situation 
before the 2011 parliament elections. Table 2 includes the distribution of answers.









Party’s board - 3.8% 7.6% 27.8% 58.2% 2.6%
Deputy candidates 1.3% 8.9% 26.6% 39.2% 22.8% 1.3%
Ordinary party 
members
6.3% 22.8% 40.5% 17.7% 10.1% 2.6%
Experts from differ-
ent areas
- 3.8% 31.6% 48.1% 13.9% 2.6%
Wider society 12.7%
20.3%
35.4% 16.5% 12.7% 2.6%
Party’s largest fi-
nancial supporters






15.6% 23.4% 24.7% 24.7% 9.1% 2.6%
SOURCE: Survey of Saeima deputies, conducted in June and July 2014
As was expected, the respondents reported that the group most involved in their party’s 
manifesto elaboration was party board members. Eighty-six per cent of parliamentary deputies 
evaluated their involvement in policy formulation as strong or very strong. Hence, the party 
elite is still the dominant actor in Latvia’s political parties when it comes to a party’s policy 
platform. The respondents reported that parliamentary deputy candidates wielded a substantial 
influence on manifesto drafting (62 per cent evaluated deputy candidates’ involvement as 
strong or very strong). They also reported that experts from different areas were particularly 
influential (62 per cent of surveyed deputies indicated experts’ involvement as strong or very 
strong). A party’s reliance on professionals in policy formulation can indicate different things. 
It can mean that a party (although not all) acknowledges its inability to fully orient in all policy 
areas in order to offer the most weighted policy solutions. This could also signal that a party is 
actually out of ideas and is willing to seek solutions from experts who have no actual political 
responsibility if the implementation of a particular policy fails. Experts may also lack knowledge 
about financial possibilities and the consequences of their consultations. 
Almost 34 per cent of participating parliamentary deputies agreed that their respective 
party, to some extent, collaborates with public relations consultants during the manifesto 
elaboration process. This could indicate that parties strategically evaluate which policy options 
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could enhance their chances of winning or losing an election. Too much reliance on media 
consultants can also signal a dangerous pattern and promote populism. It should be pointed 
out, however, that responses to the media as a group of actors were polarized. Thirty-nine per 
cent of respondents stated that political consultants have no or very weak role in their party’s 
manifesto elaboration process. 
The survey revealed that ordinary party members play a smaller role (although the margin 
is very minor) in policy formulation than the experts and the wider society. Though 27.8 per 
cent of the surveyed deputies evaluated the role of ordinary party members as “strong” or 
“very strong.”  Almost 30 per cent expressed a similar opinion regarding the influence of the 
general public. Whether this indicates the marginalization of ordinary party members is still 
to be seen. This research, however, demonstrates that inclusion in the list also gives also more 
impact over the content of electoral program. It is also interesting to witness that experts 
outside the party, according to the opinion of participating parliament members, are more 
actively involved in policy elaboration than party members at large. 
According to the survey respondents, the group least involved in the elaboration of electoral 
programs within Latvia’s political parties is comprised of those making the largest financial 
donations to the parties. Only 7.8 per cent of respondents evaluated the role of these donors 
as “strong” or “very strong,” an absolute majority said donors’ impact on their party’s policy 
platform is absent or very minor. Almost eight per cent of deputies were unable to give a precise 
evaluation of the influence of donors on their party’s elaboration of electoral programs. During 
the interviews it was evident that respondents were very eager to openly reveal the influence 
of financial supporters on policies or personalities. 
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to reveal aspects of the inner lives of political parties in Latvia. We 
focused on two important functions that every political party has to fulfill – the formulation 
of a policy platform for elections and the selection of deputy candidates. Our survey of party 
members elected to Latvia’s parliament revealed several interesting findings. The survey 
responses indicated that party board members have the most impact on Latvia’s political parties’ 
policies and personalities, at least when compared with other groups such as ordinary party 
members. The survey participants also stated that the impact of financial supporters on their 
party’s internal affairs is almost absent. However, this pattern in responses is questionable 
given media reports and the findings of previous studies. Namely, there have been a number 
of stories and reports (for example, Latvijas Avīze 2013 ) linking a variety of entrepreneurs’ 
(mostly from the building sector) generous contributions to Latvia’s parties, particularly those 
in power and subsequent sizeable contracts granted to these same companies for state or 
municipal construction projects.
The majority of the participating members of Latvia’s parliament are satisfied with the way 
deputy candidates are selected within their parties. They also tend to agree that the candidate 
selection criteria are well known within the party. At the same time, they admit that parties 
do give priority to publicly recognizable persons and those that have been internally active. 
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Future research about intra-party life in Latvia should focus on other party members as 
well. What do ordinary party members, not necessarily just those that have been elected, 
think about their party’s internal processes? Are they satisfied with the way party leadership 
is selected and how policies are formulated and candidate lists are formed?
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